Abstract Sellers often provide complimentary "no extra charge" add-ons (e.g., free Internet connection) to consumers who buy their primary products (e.g., a hotel stay), but recently add-ons that used to be free are offered for a fee. The conventional wisdom is that unadvertised add-ons for high fees help competitors increase profits that are competed away by advertising low prices for the basic products. This theory cannot explain why complimentary add-ons are still offered by some sellers. We show that providing complimentary add-ons can be profitable for sellers with monopoly power under certain demand conditions. If these demand conditions are not met, it is optimal to charge a supplementary fee for the add-on. We also show how pricing policy can be designed to selectively target or deter different consumer segments from purchasing the add-on to boost sellers' profits, providing a strategic role for selling add-ons at either below-cost or at exorbitantly high prices. Yet such behavior may have repercussions for economic welfare when it results in socially inefficient giveaways when consumers would be better served with a lower price on the basic product without the add-on or, with the other extreme, when it results in excessively high prices for an add-on that restricts sales and leads to its underprovision from a societal perspective. The paper also provides managerial insights on the design and use of add-ons.
1 Introduction "This service is complimentary." Customers have been used to receiving free "addon" products and services when they go to concerts (free programs), visit restaurants (free bread) and hotels (free Internet), fly airlines (complimentary movies, food, and drinks), buy computers (free software), or buy cosmetics (receiving free gifts). Recently, however, some sellers have started to charge fees for add-ons that were previously provided for free. Airlines in the USA and Europe started to charge customers for food and drinks served on board and for baggage carried into the airplanes. One airline even announced that it might charge passengers to use the bathroom on board by possibly putting a coin slot on the toilet door (one reporter even called it "a fee to pee", Wessling 2009 ). The move from free to fee has been previously observed in the banking industry (e.g., teller machine fees), the hotel industry (e.g., Internet service charges), and other industries (Thornton 2003; Marshall 2006; Ancarani et al. 2009 ).
Charging a fee for what used to be free often outrages consumers (e.g., McGrath 2009). But customers may also appreciate greater transparency over the individual prices they are paying for the separate elements of a product or service package (Gabaix and Laibson 2006) . Yet, there is a marketing opportunity for removing a fee to give an add-on for free, appealing to consumers attracted by offers of something extra for nothing extra. For example, Southwest Airlines has refused to follow other airlines in charging add-on fees and instead boldly promotes a "fees don't fly with us" policy (McKee 2008) . Other commonly observed examples include free extended warranties, free drinks with meal, free home delivery, and free technical support.
When is it more profitable to offer an add-on for a fee than offering it for free? Are free add-ons always good for consumers? Are they good for the economy? In this paper, we explore when it is optimal to offer a free add-on even in the absence of competitive pressure to do so and if such offers could counter-intuitively hurt consumers and lead to an economically inefficient outcome.
The analysis is based on a parsimonious model where a seller with monopolypricing power seeks to sell a primary offering with an optional add-on to two consumer segments that differ in their valuation of the two products. We examine cases in which the primary offering is purchased by a group of consumers who have relatively small but different valuations for the add-on. The key insight obtained is that the decision to offer a free add-on depends on the differences amongst consumers in how they separately and jointly value the primary offering and the addon. Specifically, providing a free add-on is optimal if the add-on is not valuable to the group of customers who value the primary offering most. Providing a free add-on can also be optimal when willingness to pay for an add-on is similar for all consumers. However, we also show that providing free add-ons may be economically inefficient as they may be supplied when the marginal cost of providing them exceeds the value they create for consumers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature. Section 3 sets out the model formulation, notation and assumptions. Section 4 characterizes the optimal (profit maximizing) pricing policy for different market conditions and considers the implications concerning the seller's add-on targeting strategy, whether to charge a fee for the add-on or offer it for free, and the impact on consumers and economic welfare. Section 5 presents a conclusion and managerial insights.
Literature review
There is plenty of established theory suggesting why add-ons fees should be charged and used as a key means to boost profits, but less on why add-ons might be offered for free other than for promotion.
The conventional wisdom about add-on pricing is a loss-leader argument whereby unadvertised supplementary add-ons are offered at high fees to help compensate for very low advertised prices needed to attract consumer to buy a basic product (e.g., Holton 1957; Hess and Gerstner 1987) . This logic is based on the presumption that firms have more pricing power for the unadvertised add-ons than for the basic products, and therefore they can earn higher margins on add-ons. Furthermore, competition may spur such activity where high-priced, high-margin add-ons compensate firms for loss-making prices on primary (core) products used to attract and capture customers (Lal and Matutes 1994) and may even serve a strategic role by dampening the overall intensity of competition (Ellison 2005) . However, this loss-leader perspective does not explain why some sellers still offer complimentary add-ons. Similarly, Goker and Ziya (2008) present a model of upselling in which a monopoly seller offers additional products at a discount, but there are no incentives for the seller to offer these products for free.
Recent research also provides a rationale for making additional charges for particular add-on services, such as for shipping and handling or canceling orders. Nonrefundable shipping and handling fees or restocking fees can reduce customer abuse of return policies such as buying products with the intention of returning them after using them for a certain period of time (Hess et al. 1996; Davis et al. 1998; Posselt et al. 2008) . Cancellation fees motivate customers to notify service providers about cancellations, receive a partial refund, and allow the seller to utilize cancelled services and increase profit (Xie and Gerstner 2007) . Also, sellers can profit by including specific service fees as default in the total bill when consumers are inattentive or lazy (Goldstein et al. 2008) . This stream of research, though, does not explain why sellers sometimes offer complimentary add-ons as opposed to charging a fee for them.
A related literature stream is on partitioned pricing, the practice of intentionally dividing a "combined price" into two or more components. For example, e-tailers can quote a combined price for a purchase that includes shipping or quote the shipping charge separately. This research is based on experiments suggesting that consumers may perceive the total cost of a transaction to be lower or better value under partitioned pricing (Lee and Han 2002; Morwitz et al. 1998 Morwitz et al. , 2009 Burman and Biswas 2007; Raghubir 2004) . Partitioned pricing may also affect consumer perceptions about the fairness to the transaction (Sheng et al. 2007 ) and may draw consumer attention to the add-ons leading to changes in the perceived utility of the base good itself (Bertini et al. 2009 ). These behavioral considerations should complement the economic reasoning for add-on pricing that is part of this paper.
Yet, the literature closest to the model presented in this paper is that on the theory of price bundling (e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976; Stremersch and Tellis 2002; Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003; Kolay and Shaffer 2003; Hitt and Chen 2005; Gilbride et al. 2008) . Using price bundling, a seller can offer related products and services priced separately, as a bundle for one price, or both options (mixed price bundling). The demand relationship between the items can be expected to have a significant impact on the optimal pricing. For example, Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) investigated theoretically how optimal price bundling should be determined when products are complements, substitutes, or unrelated. The authors conclude that if products are complements or substitutes, they should typically be priced higher as bundles compared to independently valued products.
The distinguishing feature of our model from the bundling literature is the realization that an add-on is related to the primary offering in a specific way. First, an add-on is typically valuable only together with the primary offering, but the primary offering is valuable without the add-on. Second, the added value of the add-on is relatively small compared to the value of the primary offering. For example, a free Internet service in a hotel room is only valuable when a guest occupies the room and its added value is small relative to the value of the room. In other words, there is an inherent asymmetry between the two components of the combined offering (primary product plus add-on) that imposes constraints on the optimal price bundling problem. As we show, this feature and the fact that different consumer segments may have different rank-order valuations over the primary offering and the add-on allows for circumstances where a seller may want to offer the add-on for free.
The model set-up
We consider a market with a seller offering a primary product or service (a primary offering) with an optional add-on. The add-on is not valuable to consumers without buying first the primary offering. The cost of providing the primary offering is irrelevant for the analysis, so we normalize it to zero, and the marginal cost of providing the add-on is C.
There are two consumer segments interested in purchasing the primary offering, "Highs" and "Lows". Highs have a high willingness to pay ("WTP"), V H , for the primary offering, and Lows have a low WTP, V L , thus V H > V L . For simplicity, we normalize the size of the market to 1, assuming that a fraction of the market, α, consists of Lows and the remaining fraction, 1−α, of Highs. Furthermore, we assume that the fraction of the Lows is sufficiently large, so it is profitable to sell the primary offering to all consumers. This is satisfied by assuming that
The add-on represents a supplementary offering, such as a complementary service, product accessory, feature, or extension that can increase the overall value the consumer derives from the primary offering, e.g., by enhancing its quality, capability, functionality, appearance, and/or performance. Let S H and S L denote the respective WTP for the add-on of Highs and Lows. We further assume that the value of the add-on is sufficiently small relative to the primary offering so that the total WTP for the "augmented offering" (primary offering and add-on) is still lower for the Lows, i.e.
This condition allows, within bounds, for situations where S L is either greater or less than S H . We also allow for the possibility that S L and/or S H are greater or less than C. As we will see in the next section, which consumer segment values the addon more and whether this valuation is greater than or less than the cost of providing the add-on play important roles in the design of the optimal pricing policy.
Since the seller may wish to segment consumers between taking up and not taking up the add-on, we invoke the following tie-breaking rule. If the customer is just indifferent between selecting two alternatives, the customer selects the alternative that the seller would like him/her to select. The convenience of this tie-breaking rule becomes apparent when the seller wants to deter a consumer taking up an add-on. For instance, where a consumer places no value at all on the add-on, i.e. S L =0 or S H =0, then we assume he/she will have no interest in taking up the add-on even if it is free, so saving the firm the cost of providing it for that consumer (e.g., leisure travelers having no interest in a free fax service or business travelers having no interest in free children's games in a hotel). In practice, a seemingly trivial obstacle for consumers may be sufficient for the seller to achieve the desired outcome, such as the very minor inconvenience of the consumer having to ask for the add-on.
The seller's problem is to price the primary offering and add-on to maximize profit, given that the values placed on the add-on are low relative to the values placed on the primary offering and that the primary offering is sold to the entire market, i.e., constraints (1) and (2) hold. We denote the price charged for the primary offering as P (≥0) and the fee (if there is one) charged for the add-on as F (≥0). Given the prices P and F selected by the seller, consumers decide whether to buy the primary offering and, if they do, whether also to buy the add-on. Of particular interest, is identifying the conditions under which offering the add-on for free is optimal (i.e., F=0).
Optimal pricing policy and implications
In this section, we derive the optimal pricing policy for the range of demand conditions considered in the above model set-up and the constraints given in Eqs. 1 and 2, showing when offering the add-on for a fee or for free is optimal (i.e., yields the greatest level of profits), as well as considering the implications for the firm's targeting policy and the impact on consumers.
Our starting point is to observe that with two consumer segments the seller in effect has four possible targeting options for the add-on. First, as a default case, the seller could decide not to provide an add-on or equivalently offer it at a price that no consumers would agree to pay, i.e., where F > max{S L , S H }. Secondly, when S H < S L , the seller could target and appeal to the Lows while deterring the Highs by setting the add-on fee in the range between S H and S L , i.e., F ∈ (S H , S L ]. Thirdly, when S L < S H , the seller could target the Highs and deter the Lows by setting the add-on fee in the range between S L and S H , i.e., F ∈ (S L , S H ]. Fourthly, the seller could target all consumers with the add-on by setting the add-on fee less than or equal to the minimum WTP of the two consumer segments, i.e., F ≤ min{S L , S H }.
The highest level of profit that can be achieved under each of these four addon targeting options is derived in the Appendix (see Lemma 1) and summarized in the last column of Table 1 . Comparing these profits, one can identify the optimal pricing policy in terms of the option that maximizes profits for given market conditions. In effect, the choice to use the add-on price to target or deter each consumer segment depends on which option dominates given the choice for the other segment. Thus, given the decision to deter Lows, the seller decides which is best: target Highs or deter Highs. Equally, given the decision to target Lows, the seller decides whether it is better to target Highs or deter Highs. A similar reasoning applies to a given decision over Highs and what best to do about Lows.
It turns out that it is the latter consideration that is the critical one since whether the Highs' WTP for the add-on is greater or less than the cost of providing the add-on, i.e., whether S H > C or S H < C, presents the seller with a straight choice between just two options, with the optimal choice then resting on whether the expression S L − S H + α(S H -C) is greater or less than zero. Specifically, we are able to establish the following key result regarding optimal pricing policy (see also Table 1 ).
Result 1 (optimal pricing policy) The seller's optimal pricing policy is, respectively:
(1) Option 1. Set P = V L and F > max {S L, S H } to deter all consumers from purchasing the add-on when S H < C together with S L − S H + α(S H − C)<0. (2) Option 2. Set P = V L + S L − S H and F = S H to target Lows and deter Highs with the add-on when S H < C together with S L − S H + α(S H − C)>0. (3) Option 3. Set P = V L and F = S H to target Highs and deter Lows with the addon when S H > C together with
S H } to target both Highs and
Lows with the add-on when S H > C together with S L − S H + α(S H − C)>0. 
Target Lows and deter Highs
S H < C and S L − S H + α(S H − C)>0 F=S H ≥0 P = V L + S L − S H V L + S L − (1−α)S H − αC
Target Highs and exclude Lows
Proof See the Appendix for the proofs to all stated results in the paper.
Using Result 1, the seller can determine the circumstances under which it is optimal to target or deter a specific consumer segment and also when it is best to set a fee for the add-on or offer it for free. Result 1 can also be used to determine the impact on consumers and society in terms of the economic welfare implications of the optimal behavior. We consider each of these three aspects in turn.
First, in respect of whether or not to target add-ons at the different consumer segments, Result 1 and Table 1 point to the following optimal add-on targeting strategy for the seller.
Result 2 (add-on targeting strategy) (1) The seller should target the add-on at Highs when S H > C and deter them from purchasing the add-on when S H < C. (2) The seller should target the add-on at Lows when S L − S H + α(S H − C)>0 and deter them from purchasing it when S L − S H + α(S H − C)<0.
Result 2 highlights the different stance the seller should take towards targeting or deterring Highs and Lows. In the case of Highs, the conditions are very straightforward. If the Highs have a WTP for the add-on greater than the cost of providing it (i.e., S H > C), then the seller should never seek to deter them from purchasing it by setting the fee greater than their WTP for the add-on. In contrast, when the Highs have a WTP for the add-on that is below the cost of providing it (i.e., S H < C), then the seller should always seek to deter them from purchasing the add-on.
In the case of Lows, though, the decision to target them or deter them from purchasing the add-on is more involved. The seller is better off deterring Lows when S L − S H + α(S H − C)<0 and conversely targeting them when S L − S H + α(S H − C)> 0. The former condition is necessarily satisfied if S L < S H < C and the latter condition is necessarily satisfied if S L > S H > C. However, two interesting situations emerge when these conditions do not hold. First, even when S L > C, so that the Lows' WTP exceeds the marginal supply cost, the seller may opt to deter the Lows and target the add-on solely at the Highs when their WTP is substantially greater than that of the Lows, specifically if S H > (S L − αC)/(1−α). Here, the add-on fee of S H can be used to fully extract the surplus of the Highs on the add-on. Note, though, that this condition becomes tighter the greater is α, since as the proportion of Highs shrinks then the additional surplus from targeting only Highs means increasing profits foregone by not also targeting Lows.
Second, when S L < C, there is the possibility that the seller may still wish to target the Lows, even when it means selling the add-on at below cost. This can arise when S H < S L < C, and specifically when S H < (S L − αC)/(1−α), with the seller setting the add-on fee at F = S H to deter the Highs but not the Lows and in the process generating profit of V L + S L − (1−α)S H − αC. The reason that this approach (option 2) can generate more profit than not targeting either segment (option 1) is that by providing the Lows with surplus on the add-on, of α(S L − S H ), the Lows will be prepared to pay more for the primary offering, so enabling the seller to raise its price from V L to V L + S L − S H (> V L ). This allows the seller to capture additional surplus from the Highs while leaving the Lows no worse off overall (as they still receive zero net consumer surplus). In other words, the add-on targeted only at Lows is used as a lever to extract additional surplus from the Highs. It can be seen that this strategy works even if the add-on is given away to the Lows for free when S H =0 as long as S L > αC, which can hold as long as the marginal supply cost does not greatly exceed the Lows' WTP and the proportion of Lows is not too high (as otherwise the additional surplus from Highs cannot compensate for the below-cost provision of the add-on).
Next, in terms of whether the seller should charge for add-ons or offer them for free, an important implication of the model is that free add-ons can be optimal under certain conditions:
Result 3 (add-on for fee or free?) (1) A complimentary add-on (i.e., F=0) optimizes profit for the seller when S H =0 together with S L > αC (in targeting Lows but deterring Highs). (2) A complimentary add-on (F=0) is profit-equivalent to offering it for a fee (F>0) when S H > C together with S L − S H + α(S H − C)>0 (in targeting all segments). (3) In all other circumstances, the seller is better off charging a fee for the add-on.
Result 3 shows that providing a complimentary add-on can be optimal under two scenarios: (1) when the add-on is valued only by Lows; or (2) when both Highs and Lows value it similarly. In case (1), when providing a complimentary add-on that is valuable only to Lows, the seller raises the price of the primary offering to the highest level possible to keep all consumers in the market, with only Lows using the add-on. At this point, all the surplus of the Lows is extracted and profit is maximized. Charging a fee for the add-on would require lowering the price of the primary offering to retain the Lows' custom, which would result in lower profit. This means that providing a complimentary add-on designed to appeal uniquely to Lows creates a profit opportunity.
Concerning case (2), providing a complimentary add-on can also be optimal if Highs and Lows are willing to pay a similar price for it. However, charging a fee for such add-ons can be equally optimal because the seller can lower the fee to zero and raise the price of the primary offering by the same amount without sacrificing any profits. Therefore, in this case, offering a complimentary add-on is profit equivalent to charging for it a fee. Examples of add-ons that are sometimes offered for a fee and other times are offered for free include Internet access, breakfast in hotels, and meals on airplanes, all of which have broad consumer appeal. Offering these add-ons for free would be uniquely optimal if there were additional benefits from doing so, such as increased customer attention, increased customer loyalty, or psychological preference that are based on the "magic" of the number zero (Shampanier et al. 2007 ) and the attraction of receiving something for "free" (Anderson 2009 ).
In all other circumstances, charging a fee for the add-on is optimal. Thus, for instance, where all consumers value the add-on but valuation is much higher for one group of customers then charging a fee for the add-on offers greater profit than offering it for free. Here, the fee would be set at a level that excludes consumers with very low valuation for the add-on, while extracting the entire available surplus from the remaining customers with a high valuation for the add-on. Specifically, when Highs are willing to pay much more for the add-on compared to the Lows, the optimal pricing policy is to charge a high fee that excludes the Lows and extracts more surplus from the Highs. In contrast, if the Highs' willingness to pay for the add-on is too low then it is optimal to discourage them from buying it through a low fee, but the Lows see the add-on as a bargain. This allows the seller to profit by raising the price of the primary offering to all consumers.
In regard to the impact of the seller's add-on strategy on consumers and economic welfare, we can observe that free add-ons may be attractive to customers who value and intend to make use of them but they nonetheless could waste resources if the marginal cost of providing them exceeds the value they create for consumers. For instance, free or very cheap add-ons could be taken up by customers but then not used and just wasted instead (e.g., Wansink et al. 2000) . In our framework, we have assumed that the seller is able, perhaps through introducing some minor hassle cost, to avoid such waste by deterring consumers taking up a complimentary add-on if they place absolutely no value on them. Nevertheless, even when consumers do value and intend to utilize the add-ons, economic inefficiency may still arise in the framework examined here. Specifically, there are two situations where the seller's privately optimal behavior is economically inefficient in the sense of resulting in less net economic welfare (defined as the sum of profits and total consumer surplus) than could otherwise be achieved through a different pricing arrangement. These two situations are summarized in the following finding.
Result 4 (inefficient pricing of add-ons) The seller's optimal pricing policy results in economically inefficient outcomes when (1) S H < S L < C and
In both situations, the disparity between privately optimal and socially optimal outcomes arises because of the seller's use of the add-on to extract additional surplus from the Highs. However, there is an important difference between the two situations. In the first case, the seller intentionally over-sells the add-on with a below-cost price as a means to lever a higher price on the primary offering, which extracts greater surplus from the Highs but results in a social waste of resources as the gain in profits is not sufficient to outweigh the loss in consumer surplus. In the second case, the seller intentionally under-sells the add-on with a sufficiently exorbitant price that puts off Lows from buying the add-on, so some economic surplus is lost, while fully extracting the Highs' consumer surplus from buying the add-on. Thus, in both cases, the Highs literally "pay the price" for the targeted add-on strategy, but in the former case it is through the indirect means of a higher price on the primary offering and in the latter case through the direct means of a higher price on the add-on.
Conclusions and managerial insights
Service providers often compete to attract consumers with a low price for a primary service and then charge high fees for add-ons, but this loss-leader pricing strategy does not explain why complimentary add-ons are offered in many markets. This paper explains why offering free add-ons bundled with a primary service can be profitable even in the absence of price competition. In contrast to the existing price bundling literature, the analysis here explicitly recognizes the inherent asymmetry between consumers' valuations of primary and add-on offerings, where an add-on is typically valuable only together with the primary offering but the primary offering is valuable without the add-on, and also that the added value of the add-on is relatively small compared to the value of the primary offering. Recognizing this asymmetry and taking into account heterogeneity in consumers' valuations for the primary and add-on offerings, the analysis leads to conditions under which it is profitable to offer an add-on for free (price bundling) against offering it for a fee (price unbundling). Specifically, a free add-on is more profitable than offering it for a fee if a customer segment has a high valuation for the add-on but a relatively low valuation for the primary service, and another segment has a higher valuation for the primary service but places no value on the add-on. Under such demand conditions, the free add-on allows the seller to raise the price of the primary offering and profit by extracting more consumer surplus compared to a pricing policy under which the add-on is offered for a fee.
In practical terms of applying the targeting approach developed here, managers can estimate willingness to pay and tradeoffs between prices for the primary service and for add-ons. These estimates can help sort consumers into the segments identified in Table 1 . Our analysis suggests that applying add-on fees makes sense when valuations for the primary service and the add-on are strongly aligned, i.e., segments have distinct "high" or "low" valuations for both items, while free add-ons might be appropriate for other valuation patterns. Taking hotels as an illustration, we can see why high-end hotels charge for Internet access when the service is much more valuable for business travelers who typically stay in such hotels (targeting Highs and excluding Lows, consistent with row 3 of Table 1 ). Equally, we can see why low-end hotels offer free Internet access (e.g., http://www.wiredfreespot.com/) when the majority of their guests are leisure travelers (targeting all segments, consistent with row 4 of Table 1 ). Also, hotels offering "children stay free" targeting families on vacation can help managers increase the price of the room to all consumers (targeting Lows and deterring Highs, consistent with row 2 of Table 1 ). The same can be said for restaurants offering "kids eat free" (e.g., http:// travelwithkids.about.com/b/2007/11/29/kids-stay-free.htm).
In respect of the design of free add-ons, and bearing in mind the economics maxim that there are "no free lunches," managers should look to devise "free lunches" that specifically appeal to the targeted segment (Lows) while getting other consumers (Highs) to pay for them (through higher prices on the primary offering). Thus, considering what will prevent "leakage" to ensure that the free offers are only taken up by the targeted segment also presents a challenging segmentation problem for mangers. Tying the offer to a differentiating characteristic or endowment of the target segment can be useful (e.g., the appeal of "children stay for free" to leisure travelers but with no value to business travelers).
Finally, a neglected aspect in the paper is the impact of competition, which provides an interesting avenue for future research. We envisage two opposing tensions. First, rivalry and a prisoners' dilemma process might spur competitors to levy charges for a wide range of add-ons (which might explain developments in the airline industry). Second, competition might induce rivals to utilize free add-ons to create a point of differentiation (e.g., Southwest Airlines seeking to stand out from the crowd).
Appendix-proofs for analytical results
As a first step in proving the four results stated in the paper, we first establish the maximum attainable profits that can be achieved under each of the four targeting options as stated in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 (attainable profits) The pricing strategy that maximizes profits under each add-on targeting option is respectively:
(1) Option 1. Set P = V L and F > max{S L , S H } to deter all consumers from purchasing the add-on to achieve profit of V L . (2) Option 2. Set P = V L + S L − S H and F = S H when S H < S L to target Lows and deter Highs and achieve profit of V L + S L − (1−α)S H − αC. (3) Option 3. Set P = V L and F = S H when S L < S H to target Highs and deter Lows and achieve profit of V L + (1−α)(S H − C). (4) Option 4. Set P = V L + S L − F and F ≤ min{S L , S H } to target both Highs and Lows achieve profit of V L + S L − C.
Proof (1) Setting F > max{S L , S H } ensures that neither consumer segment will be interested in buying the add-on. Then, setting P = V L enables the seller to sell one unit yielding a profit of V L (where the primary offering cost zero to supply). Charging P < V L does not increase the amount sold, so simply reduces profit below V L . Charging P > V L reduces the amount sold as Lows will not buy the primary offering and then the highest profit that the seller can achieve is to set P = V H to fully extract surplus from the Highs and achieve profit of (1−α)V H , but from (1) this profit is less than V L . (2) To exclude Highs, the add-on fee must be greater than or equal to their WTP (bearing in mind the tie-breaking rule), i.e., F ≥ S H . To target Lows, the add-on fee must be less than or equal to their WTP, i.e., F ≤ S L . Thus, the feasible fee range is S H ≤ F ≤ S L . Setting F = S H allows the seller to set P = V L + S L − S H , since the Lows will pay more for the primary offering when it is bundled with the add-on so long as the combined price is not greater than their combined WTP. Here, the seller fully extracts the surplus of Lows by ensuring P + F = V L + S L . With this arrangement, the seller sells one unit of the primary offering and α units of the add-on and
However, this would mean a lower price on the primary offering which would then entail less surplus extracted from the Highs for the same quantity sold, thus a net reduction in profit. (3) As noted above with (1), the surplus maximizing price on the primary offering when not selling the add-on to Lows is P = V L , since any lower or higher reduces revenue. The add-on targeted at Highs but excluding Lows offers the seller a further source of income, with this additional profit maximized by fully extracting the Highs' surplus on the add-on, i.e., setting F = S H , selling 1−α units of the add-on, yielding a total profit of V L + (1−α)(S H − C).
(4) In targeting Highs and Lows with the add-on, and taking account of condition (2), the best the seller can achieve is to fully extract the surplus of the lows by ensuring
This maximum can be achieved for any add-on fee in the range up to the minimum of S H and S L (since exceeding that level would deter at least one segment from buying the add-on), with the primary offering priced at
Thus, there is a range of add-on fees from zero up to that minimum WTP level that offers the same profit level of
Proof of Result 1 When S H < C, the only way the seller can persuade Highs to buy the add-on is by pricing it below the cost of providing it, i.e. set F < C. In this situation, the seller is always better off excluding the Highs as revealed by comparing the relevant attainable profits as stated in Lemma 1. If the seller were to exclude the Lows then the difference in profit from deterring Highs (option 1) rather than targeting them (option 3) is −(1−α)(S H − C)>0 since S H < C. In contrast, if the seller were to target the Lows then the difference in profit from deterring the Highs (option 2) rather than targeting them (option 4) is again −(1−α)(S H − C)>0. Thus, when S H < C, the dominant strategy is to deter Highs, so ruling out options 3 and 4. This leaves a straight choice between options 1 and 2. The former offers greater and therefore optimal profit when S L − S H + α(S H − C)<0, as claimed by (1). The latter offers greater and thus optimal profit when S L − S H + α(S H − C)>0, as claimed by (2). When S H > C, we have the reverse situation where the seller is always better off targeting the Highs regardless of its policy towards Lows. Note that here, option 3 offers greater profit than option 1 and option 4 offers greater profit than option 2. Thus, we are left with a straight choice between options 3 and 4. The former offers greater and therefore optimal profit when S L − S H + α(S H − C)<0, as claimed by (3). The latter offers greater and therefore optimal profit when S L − S H + α(S H − C)>0, as claimed by (4).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 2 This follows directly from Result 1 and Proof of Result 4 (1) For these market conditions, Result 1 and Table 1 show that addon targeting option 2 is optimal from the seller's perspective, whereby the seller uses a below-cost add-on targeted only at Lows with the purpose of extracting greater surplus from the Highs through a higher price for the primary offering. In this case, the seller's profit is V L + S L − (1−α)S H − αC, the Highs' consumer surplus is (1−α)(V H − V L − S L + S H ), and the Lows' consumer surplus is 0, so net economic welfare is (1−α)V H + αV L + α(S L − C). However, net economic welfare would be higher under option 1, where the add-on is not sold to either consumer segment, as the profit is V L , the Highs' surplus is (1−α)(V H − V L ), the Lows' surplus is 0, so total welfare is (1−α)V H + αV L , thus exceeding that of option 2 by α(C − S L )>0. (2) In these circumstances, Result 1 and Table 1 show that option 3 is the privately optimal add-on targeting strategy, whereby the seller sets such a high price for the add-on that it deters the Lows from buying it while fully extracting the Highs' surplus for the add-on. Here, profit is V L + (1−α)(S H − C) and total consumer surplus is (1−α)(V H − V L ), so net economic welfare is (1−α)(V H + S H -C) + αV L . Yet, under option 4, involving selling the add-on to both consumer segments offers, profit is V L + S L -C and total consumer surplus is (1-α)(V H -V L -S L + S H ), so net welfare is (1-α) (V H + S H ) + α(V L + S L ) -C, which exceeds that of option 3 by α(S L -C)>0.
Q.E.D.
